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JEAN-GABRIEL LETURCQ 
ABSTRACT / RÉSUMÉ
HERITAGE-MAKING AND POLICIES OF IDENTITY IN THE “POST-CONFLICT 
RECONSTRUCTION” OF SUDAN
This article critically examines the political instrumentalisation of identity 
and cultural heritage in the Sudanese context. After 50 years of civil wars por-
trayed as a conflict of identities, cultural identity is supposedly being used in 
an opposite way. The peace implementation process following the signature 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, invokes cultural identity for 
a wide societal project of reconciliation through the recognition of cultural, 
religious, and linguistic diversity through a policy of cultural heritage-making. 
Museums are being constructed and new fields of heritage, such as intangible 
heritage, are being created. Through the assessment of the concept of heri-
tage as a mean of political recognition, it will be possible to understand how 
the Sudanese authorities, as well as dissident groups, are using the heritage-
making process as a political resource and a means for pacification or, on the 
contrary, for political contestation.
PATRIMONIALISATION ET POLITIQUES IDENTITAIRES DANS LA RECON-
STRUCTION « POST-CONFLIT » DU SOUDAN  
Cet article analyse l’instrumentalisation à des fins politiques du patrimoine 
et du concept d’identité culturels dans le contexte soudanais. Après la signature 
de l’Accord de paix global en 2005 mettant fin à 50 années de guerres civiles 
décrites comme des conflits d’identités, le processus de paix mis en œuvre 
invoque l’identité culturelle pour servir un vaste projet sociétal de réconcilia-
tion. Celui-ci prévoit la reconnaissance de la diversité culturelle, religieuse et 
linguistique du pays à travers une politique de patrimonialisation. Des musées 
sont en cours de construction et de nouveaux champs patrimoniaux, comme 
le patrimoine immatériel, sont inventés. En analysant le concept de patrimoine 
comme un moyen de reconnaissance politique, il sera possible de comprendre 
comment les autorités soudanaises, ainsi que des groupes dissidents, utilisent 
le processus de patrimonialisation comme une ressource politique : comme 
un moyen de pacification ou au contraire, de contestation politique. 
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 HERITAGE-MAKING AND POLICIES 
OF IDENTITY IN THE “POST- CONFLICT 
RECONSTRUCTION” OF SUDAN
INTRODUCTION
“The essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things 
in common; and also that they have forgotten many things.” 
Ernest Renan, What is a Nation? (1882) 
According to the definition of nation given by Ernest Renan, talking about nation in the case of Sudan is intricate. Sudan is the largest African postco-
lonial country and is characterised by broad geographical, ethnical, linguistic, 
cultural, and religious diversity. The country has been split by several civil 
wars running since the independence of 1956 until 2005, when a North-South 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed. The wars revealed clea-
vages between the South and North of Sudan, and also shaped the boundaries 
of conflictive identities. The CPA provides a national framework for peace until 
2011 when a referendum would eventually give its independence to Southern 
Sudan. In the 2005-2011 interim period, one of the goals of the CPA imple-
mentation process along with political and economical stakes, is to challenge 
the negative effects of the previous instrumentalisation of identity, through the 
promotion of cultural heritage as a means of recognition and intercultural dia-
logue. The aim of this article is to examine critically the political use of cultural 
heritage in the “post-conflict” context of Sudan. 
The starting point of this article is the analysis of the narratives on conflic-
tive identities developed by both of the belligerents to justify the violence of 
the war. On the one hand, the historical reasons of the North-South opposition 
have been portrayed, by belligerents and some analysts, as an opposition of 
identities.1 The understanding of identity as the root cause of civil wars in 
1. Deng, 1995.
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Sudan is considered as a given fact. On the other hand, the CPA proposes to 
challenge the negative effects of the instrumentalisation of identity, allocating 
it a positive role in the peace construction process. The CPA implementation 
process is endorsing this vision through the promotion of cultural heritage 
policies. Taking into account these two symmetric visions on identity, how is 
cultural heritage being promoted in Sudan?
This article analyses how the concept of cultural heritage is being assessed 
and implemented as a positive image of identity, in contrast with the former 
negative assumptions on identity. Therefore cultural heritage appears as a 
political argument used by national authorities to supposedly consolidate the 
policies of recognition of minorities. But cultural heritage as a political argu-
ment had been also used by the opponents to the current political regime to 
affirm their cultural rights, as it will be exemplified by the case-study of the 
popular resistance to the Merowe Dam construction.
The first part of this study briefly provides some theoretical inputs on the 
relationship between cultural heritage and identity. The second part highlights 
the use of the concept of identity in the context of civil wars in Sudan. The 
third part discusses the policy of heritage-making for peace as a mirror effect of 
the narratives on conflictive identities. Finally, the fourth part analyses the sub-
version of the concept of heritage as a means of recognition of cultural rights.
THE PARADOXES OF CULTURAL IDENTITY AND HERITAGE-MAKING 
Heritage does not exist per se but is invented or created 
“through metacultural operations that extend museological values and 
methods (collection, documentation, preservation, presentation, eva-
luation and interpretation) to living persons, their knowledge, practices, 
artefacts, social worlds and life styles.”2
This process of invention or creation of cultural heritage is what is referred 
as heritage-making in this article. The central argument here is that heritage 
is the outcome of the strategic interests of the different actors involved in the 
process of heritage-making. The article attempts to understand who the actors 
are and to analyse their respective interests in the specific context of heritage-
making in Sudan.
2. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 2006, p. 161.
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Cultural heritage and identity 
According to Meskell, heritage involves questions of identity, locality, reli-
gion and economic value.3 From the outset, a nexus between identity and 
cultural heritage overshadows the concept of heritage. Other authors also 
highlight that the concept of heritage is a cultural product as well as a political 
resource.4
The concept of heritage was introduced in Europe in the context of the 
creation of nation-states during the 18th and 19th centuries.5 The invention of 
heritage, similar to the invention of tradition examined by Hobsbawm and 
Ranger, “seek[s] to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by rep-
etition, which automatically implies continuity with the past”6 and somehow 
‘thickens’ the existence of a nation. Therefore, following the fundamental 
Western conceptualisation of heritage, the concept appears as an “instrument 
in the ‘discovery’ or creation and subsequent nurturing of a national identity”.7 
Further, the concepts of national identity and cultural heritage have been glo-
balised along with those of the nation-state in the colonial and post-colonial 
periods.8 In the case of Sudan, the conceptualisation of a Sudanese national 
identity is by itself problematic: the multiculturalism has resulted in a historical 
pattern of division between sectors of the Sudanese population, thus preven-
ting the creation of a single national identity. 
More recently, the issue of multiculturalism seems to have brought adjust-
ment to the concept of heritage: becoming globalised, the concept is nowadays 
also related to identity rights and recognition of the rights of minorities. 
Therefore, as stated by Weiss, there is a “paradox of multiculturalism”9 which 
can be seen in the contradictory visions of heritage as a resource for national 
identity and, simultaneously, as the recognition of sub-national (ethnic, local 
or religious) identities. This article attempts to understand this paradox in the 
context of the Sudanese heritage-making policies. Through the assessment of 
the concept of heritage as a means of recognition, it is possible to understand 
how the Sudanese authorities, as well as the dissident groups, have been using 
the heritage-making process as a political resource. 
3. Meskell, 2002.
4. Graham et al., 2005, p. 30.
5. Poulot, 2005; Choay, 1993.
6. Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1992, p. 1; see also Anderson, 1991, chapter 10: “The 
Map, the Census, the Museum”, p. 163-185.
7. Graham et al., 2005, p. 27.
8. Appadurai, 2001.
9. Weiss, 2007, p. 415.
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Strategies and institutions of heritage
Heritage can be understood as a political resource by several actors across 
space and time. Actors in the heritage-making process assign diverse cultural 
meanings and socio-political functions to heritage, and heritage may become 
a component of broader economic and/or political strategies. Through the 
analysis of the process on institutionalisation of heritage, this study focuses on 
museum policies and the more recent creation of alternative fields of heritage, 
such as the intangible heritage.10 The institutionalisation of heritage unravels 
the actors’ sense of how to manoeuvre with and/or against institutions. Actors 
are the individuals or institutions involved in the creation and implementation 
of heritage polices. Institutions are the museums, as well as national and inter-
national institutions in charge of the cultural heritage management. However, 
heritage itself can also be considered as a social institution.11
Buntix and Karp introduce the idea of “tactical museologies” stating 
that “this sense of maneuvers (which Gramsci termed a ‘war of position’) 
is simultaneously the product of the alternative and provisional standing of 
these museums and their often frictional and antagonistic relationship either 
to established museums and/or the broader social order.”12 Based on these 
assumptions, this article identifies the actors involved in the heritage-making 
process in the Sudanese context in order to disentangle the utilisation and 
instrumentalisation, as well as the strategies and the frictions, surrounding the 
institution of heritage as a representation of certain political orders and cultu-
ral visions on identity. 
POLITICS OF IDENTITY IN SUDAN 
This section aims to analyse the use of the concept of identity in the 
Sudanese context in the period between the 1950’s and today, in order to intro-
duce the main elements for a further discussion of heritage-making in Sudan. 
The North-South Sudanese civil wars have often been considered as a “war 
of visions”13 based on the question of identity. The idea of competing visions 
has been promoted by the belligerents and the analysts to explain the several 
conflicts that took place in the Sudanese territory during the last decades.
10. Graham et al., 2005, p. 30.
11. Douglas, 1986.
12. Buntix and Karp, 2006, p. 207.
13. Deng, 1995.
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The diverse actors involved in Sudan’s civil wars have developed narra-
tives on competing identities, which fixed some points of reference in terms 
of religion, race, and geography, to categorise the different groups. The nar-
ratives have stipulated two main boundaries: on the one hand, Muslim and 
Arab populations in Northern Sudan and, on the other hand, African and 
non-Muslim (Christian or animist) populations in the South. These categories 
have been opposed in the following manner: North versus South, Arab versus 
African, Muslim versus animist or Christian. Next, the article’s overview of the 
Sudanese civil wars aims at articulating the definition of competing identities 
and the evolution of the political discourse. It also highlights the emergence of 
the idea of a conflict for political and economic power, in which the lines of 
conflict would be the margins versus the centre. 
First civil war (1955-1972)
The civil war opposing between the South and the North began a few 
months before the independence of the country in 1956. The rivalry between 
an Arab-Muslim educated elite in the north and a southern elite increased as 
the state became weaker after the withdrawal of the British colonial power.14 
The Northern Arab elite emerged as the ruling power and have since led a 
policy of arabization and islamization of the South.15 The Southern elite based 
their political position on the resistance of this assimilation.16 
Political tension increased until 1960 when the southern elite began to be 
influenced by newly independent countries south of Sudan, and established 
links with other African independentist movements of the British Eastern 
African Empire.17 The southern discourse has since then assumed an anti-
imperialist rhetoric portraying the North as the new colonial power that is 
pursuing another ‘civilising mission’ on the South.
The Anyanya guerrilla movements took over in the most southern regions 
and later spread until the central regions of Sudan. The seized territories have 
become what is commonly considered as Southern Sudan.18 Thus, the geo-
graphical borders between North and South appear to be a by-product of this 
civil war, consequently raising the idea of a “divided nationalism”.19 In 1969, 
the revolution led by Nimeiri, the would-be President of Sudan, was based 
14. Johnson, 2006, p. 21 et passim.
15. Holt and Daly, 1988, p.178.
16. Idris, 2001, p. 105.
17. Woodward, 2003, p. 39.
18. Ibid., p. 41.
19. Deng, 1995, p. 101.
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on an Arab and African anti-imperialist ideology, which also aimed at conflict 
resolution at the national level and at the economic recovery of the country.20 
Addis Ababa peace (1972-1982)
The socialist regime of Nimeiri, which came to power in 1969, has promo-
ted the idea of a “recognition of the cultural differences of the North and the 
South” based on the belief of a “united Socialist Sudan”.21 A Peace Agreement 
was signed in 1972 in Addis Ababa between the Nimeiri regime and the lea-
ders of the South. The peace agreement asserted a certain degree of autonomy 
to the South and attempted to seal a new political vision on the Sudan. At 
the time, President Nimeiri exhibited a vision of the country as an “Afro-Arab 
entity”22, and this vision came as a reaction to the processes of arabization and 
islamization and appeared to be an effort to conceal the two major identities 
in the country. 
As Nimeiri’s regime weakened throughout the 1970’s, the paradoxical 
situation of Sudan and the feeling of dissatisfaction towards the unlikely unity 
of the country increased during this period. At the beginning of the 1980’s, 
the President formed a number of alliances with the northern Islamist Muslim 
Brotherhood. In 1981, Nimeiri virtually abrogated the Addis Ababa agreement 
by dissolving the Southern Regional Assembly.23 
 At the same time, the economic decay of the country led to explosive tur-
moil in the South and social tension increased.
The second civil war (1982-2005)
The conflict resumed in 1982, and the second civil war was initiated in 
1983 as a direct consequence of the imposition of the Sharica (Islamic law) to 
the entire country. The Southern People Liberation Army (SPLA) and its poli-
tical wing, the Southern People Liberation Movement (SPLM), appeared on 
the political landscape issuing a manifesto in July 1983. The Manifesto on 
the “question of nationality and religion” addressed the questions of racism, 
tribalism, and ethnicity24, denounced the current and historical situation of the 
country’s disequilibrium and declared the aims of the SPLA/M of unifying all 
the Southern guerrilla movements. The SPLA/M leader John Garang soon after 
20. Woodward, 2003, p. 43.
21. Stevens, 1976, p. 248.
22. Ibid., p. 247.
23. Woodward, 2003, p. 50.
24. Johnson, 2006, p. 63.
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took control of the rural areas in the South, expelling the governmental control 
and forces from these areas. The first victories of the SPLA were facilitated by 
the weaknesses of the Socialist regime. 
A coup d’état perpetrated in 1985 switched the socialist regime to an 
Islamic fundamentalist military regime in Khartoum, and step by step reinforced 
Hassan al-Turabi (1989-1993) and Omar al-Bashir (Chief of State 1989-1993, 
and President since 1993). The central issue of the new government concer-
ning the national political system had been the implementation of the Sharica. 
In the early 1990’s, the civil war took a new ethnic character in terms of 
discourse and strategy. The ruling elite of Khartoum began to use the ethnic 
argument to divide the SPLA. The main strategy of the regime of Khartoum 
had been the support of tribal rivalries against the Dinka-oriented SPLA, thus 
launching a counter-offensive on the South.25 Simultaneously, Garang called 
for solidarity of minorities against the hegemonic Arab-Muslim ruling elite of 
the North.26 The SPLA, as well as the opposed factions, intensified their recruit-
ment and all the groups enrolled children in their armies and used the attacks 
on the civil population as threats and a means of pressure on their enemies.27 
This period was the most violent period of the war. International organisations 
estimate that approximately 6.1 million people were internally displaced and 
550,000 refugees fled to neighbouring countries.28 
The dissemination of wars on the margins (1991-nowadays)
Economic factors have also played a role in the several conflicts in 
Sudanese territory. The economic gap between the North and South deepened 
considerably during the wars and the socio-economic wealth issue appeared 
strongly in the political discourse of the South in the last period of the conflict. 
John Garang, the SPLM/A leader has repeatedly denounced the underdeve-
lopment of the remote regions in Southern Sudan and expressed his plans for 
an economic solution in his radical project of the “New Sudan”.29 Based on 
the idea of integration of “marginalised” minorities in the framework of central 
power, Garang called for a connection between the Southern region and other 
“deprived and exploited” regions of Sudan: all should unite to challenge the 
25. Johnson, 2006, p. 111.
26. Ibid., p. 127.
27. Idris, 2001, p. 130.
28. For more information see: UNHCR, “Urgent Needs for Planned South Sudan 
Repatriation”, 11th of April, 2005.
29. Largely diffused, for example : Garang J., al-Iltizâm bi-l-Wahda: Raw’yya al-Sudan 
al-Jadîd (The Engagement for Unity: The Concept of the New Sudan), Khartoum, 
Cairo, 1998.
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minority, elitist, Muslim-Arab regime at the core of the country’s decision-
making process.30 As a result, after 1991, the conflict extended to the Upper 
Nile province, Kordofan, and even to the Eastern region and to the Darfur in 
the west. War in Sudan became a “network of internal wars”31, involving many 
actors in different fronts, be they geographical or political. 
Summing up, the discourse on the North-South conflict has shifted from 
a war against political domination from the North (centre) towards a conflict 
of peripheries against the centre, with the several peripheries (South, East, 
and West) demanding power and the sharing of economic wealth. The shift of 
understanding of the conflict had been an important move from the concep-
tion of a “war of visions” on identity that gave a chance to a political solution 
for the North-South war, confirmed by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
framework.32
THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT AND THE QUESTION OF 
HERITAGE 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on the 9th of 
January 2005 in Naivasha (Kenya) by the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir 
and the SPLA/M leader John Garang.33 The main goal of the CPA is to sup-
port the peace construction process in the country through a ceasefire and 
the explicit political recognition of Southern Sudan by the Northern ruling 
elite. The CPA also includes provisions for an interim period until 2011, when 
Southern Sudan will have a referendum to decide about the would-be seces-
sion of the region. The central question of this section is to understand how the 
CPA is supposedly opening a new page in Sudanese history and, at the same 
time, to understand the role of heritage and heritage-making in the process.
A policy of national unity
The CPA is the basic document establishing the framework for national 
security in Sudan, as well as a framework for power and economic wealth-
sharing between the two regions. In terms of national political organisation, it 
envisions an interim “one State, two systems” arrangement until 2011, when 
30. Woodward, 2005, p. 51.
31. Johnson, 2006, p. 127.
32. As this article is under press in September 2009, the peace process appears uncer-
tain as internal conflicts resumed in Southern Sudan. 
33. The complete text of the agreement is available on line at http://www.unmis.org/
English/documents/cpa-en.pdf.
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a referendum will give the choice to the Southern Sudanese populations on 
whether to remain unified with the North or to become independent (a pos-
sible case of state secession). The current “one State, two systems” is based on 
the creation of an autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), as well 
as a political representation for Southern Sudan in a Government of National 
Unity (GoNU). By the end of 2005, both the GoNU and the GoSS had already 
been established.34 
The political (re)construction of the country is allegedly the priority for 
the newly empowered authorities and their international partners, such as the 
United Nations, World Bank and bilateral donors. Following the signature of 
the CPA, in March 2005, the Sudanese authorities (GoNU, GoSS) and the 
international community established the “agenda” for peace implementation 
in Sudan. A United Nations and World Bank Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), 
which had been carried out in close consultation with the Sudanese authori-
ties and other partners of the international community, issued a “Framework 
for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Reduction” in 2005. The stated 
goal is to promote sustainable peace based on national reconciliation and 
reconstruction.35
The peace implementation documents focus on power and economic 
wealth-sharing, but also include a broad societal project of reconciliation. 
This specific goal highlights the construction of a nation that would overcome 
the negative effects of the casualties and the root causes of the wars. Hence, in 
addition to power and economic issues, the JAM report also describes 
“a strategy and vision that will give the unity of Sudan a chance during 
the Interim Period by making it attractive, and through a reformed and 
fully developed system of governance in which all Sudanese are equal 
stakeholders”.36
In the same fashion, the CPA had already stated the aim to pursue 
“values of justice, democracy, good governance, respect fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the individual, mutual understanding and tole-
rance of diversity”.37 
The language seems very similar to that of other international documents 
on peace and reconciliation all around the world. The same will be observed 
in the documents about heritage policies for the country, as will be discussed 
in the following section.
34. El Obeid, 2006, p. 2 et passim.
35. JAM, 2005.
36. JAM, 2005, p. 3.
37. CPA, 2005, p. 2 
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Cultural diversity and heritage for peace 
The recognition of cultural diversity also appears to be of significance in 
the Sudanese nation-building, as the framing texts (namely the CPA and the 
JAM report) state identity as a main issue in the process of conflict resolution 
and peace implementation. Thus, the goal of peace implementation had alle-
gedly been established in order to overcome the rhetoric of identity clashes 
and, at the same time, to promote cultural diversity as the basis of Sudanese 
national identity. The first chapter of the CPA, corresponding to the Machakos 
Agreement signed in 2002, states the following principles in order to promote 
the unity of the country: 
“1.5 The people of Sudan share a common heritage and aspirations and 
accordingly agree to work on : 1.5.1 Establish a democratic system of 
governance taking into account the cultural, racial, religious and lin-
guistic characteristic and gender equality of the people of the Sudan 
[…]”38
In the same line of thought as the CPA, the JAM proposes the implemen-
tation of a framework based on national identity and the resolution of the 
conflicts of identity developed during the wars. The JAM report includes the 
principle of recognition of cultural diversity as a priority of the peace agenda, 
as the following statement exemplifies:
“A sense of common ownership of the shared heritage and the 
various cultural components of the population can also be restored by 
strengthening intercultural and inter-religious dialogue and developing 
protection of the national heritage.”39
The JAM report, as in this statement and similar ones, highlights that heritage 
has become an issue in the construction of national unity, in which “culture 
and tradition are the basis for national identity and should be regarded as 
a fundamental element for reconciliation”.40 The JAM uses the conventional 
“language of heritage”41 that deals with notions of ownership and property. 
This conventional perception of heritage, as that promoted by the JAM, implies 
some automatic policies related to institutions of heritage.
38. Ibid., p. 2.
39. JAM, 2005, vol. 1, p. 30.
40. Ibid., p. 64.
41. Meskell, 2002, p. 567.
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An agenda for heritage-making
The JAM formulates recommendations for the implementation of cultural 
policies, with a proposal that includes two different sets – one for Northern 
Sudan, and another for Southern Sudan, according to the principle of “one 
State, two systems”. 
For Northern Sudan, the first recommendation is the development of 
“joint studies, debates, and discussions about the country’s cultural heri-
tage, customary law and traditional structure [are required to create] a 
better mutual understanding among all Sudanese”.42 
The second recommendation focuses on 
“ the capacity building and training, specifically […] for the conser-
vation of the ancient cultural structures and their preservation and 
presentation on their original sites or in museums […] as part of the 
efforts to promote reconciliation”.43 
For Southern Sudan, the JAM report deploys a commonly accepted rela-
tionship of modernity and traditions that in the case of Sudan had been 
formulated as early as the 1970’s by Francis Deng.44 The JAM report highlights 
the need of recognition of cultural diversity in order to drive the country on 
the way to “ ‘modernization’ [sic] on the basis of solid knowledge and unders-
tanding of the past”45, which would supposedly make possible a specific 
administration of the Southern populations according to their own “customary 
law and traditions”.46 According to the report, the construction of this “solid 
knowledge” could be part of the process of harmonisation of the diverse cus-
tomary laws in order to enhance the role of traditional chiefs, but at the same 
time to proscribe traditions which supposedly do not correspond to internatio-
nal standards, such as the UN Human Rights Declaration. 
The rhetoric of tradition and modernisation assumed by the JAM report 
reflects the conventional system of values attached to heritage as formulated 
42. JAM, 2005, vol. 3, p. 65.
43. Ibid.
44. The JAM report justifies the importance of heritage by a quotation of Francis 
Deng’s Tradition and Modernisation (1971): “For peace to be genuine and sustai-
nable, it must address the deep-rooted crisis of national identity. This will mean 
balancing between the rigidity of self-perceptions about identity, which would entail 
recognizing racial, ethnic, cultural and religious diversities, and building on the flui-
dity of self-identification to forge a new sense of an all-embracing national identity.”
45. JAM, 2005, vol.3, p. 65.
46. Ibid.
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by the conventions of the UNESCO.47 These conventions deploy a specific 
language of heritage that involves notions of values and rights, and ownership 
and property. In the formulation used in the JAM report, the notion of 
ownership leads to a subsequent value of appropriation of heritage. The JAM 
report eventually proposes an application of this conventional understanding 
to Sudan. The JAM recommends: (1) extensive studies on heritage, archaeo-
logy and ethnography; (2) rehabilitation and strengthening of “key cultural 
heritage institutions like museums and site orientation centres”48; (3) inventory 
of archaeological sites, to document and manage cultural heritage; and (4) 
provision of training to support and promote capacity building of the staff in 
charge of this historical legacy. 
Through these recommendations, the JAM report tends to define the main 
lines in terms of heritage-making policies for Sudan. The document had 
been presented to the international and bilateral donors at the Oslo Donors’ 
Conference, in May 2005, apparently with concrete results in terms of invest-
ment in Sudan. In the specific field of cultural heritage, a total of 4 million US 
dollars had been allocated on a total of 4.5 billion US dollars.49 These numbers 
show the relative importance of heritage-making in the process of reconstruc-
tion. However, the question remains on how to move forward from the idea of 
making peace to making heritage in the context of a post-conflict situation in 
Sudan? And, who will be the actors responsible for managing and/or creating 
this heritage? 
INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE SUDANESE CULTURAL HERITAGE
This section throws light on the current national and external actors 
involved in the cultural and heritage policies in the context of Sudan, and 
their diverse interests, responsibilities and actions in the process. Through the 
observation and analysis of this process, it will be shown that the current insti-
tutionalisation of cultural heritage in Sudan is mainly focusing on the political 
recognition of national diversity rather than in the construction of heritage 
itself.
47. See UNESCO, 1954, 1972, 2003 and 2005a.
48. JAM, 2005, vol. 3, p. 66.
49. United Nations, 2005.
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National and global institutional actors at work
At the Sudanese national level, the National Corporation for Antiquities 
and Museums (NCAM) is in charge of the management of heritage,50 and 
its mission is to manage antiquities and museums. This conceptualisation of 
national heritage management is embedded in an old-fashion conceptuali-
sation of cultural heritage, which conceives archaeological antiquities as the 
main object of heritage, and museums as its main institution. This highlights 
the inadequacy of the NCAM to accomplish the mission in terms of implemen-
tation of the heritage policies as proposed in the CPA and JAM documents. 
In order to support the NCAM in its renewed mission, UNESCO is currently 
financing, training and monitoring the transition period for the extension of the 
heritage policies. 
At the 33rd UNESCO general conference held in Paris in 2005, the General 
Conference adopted a resolution on “Strengthening of cooperation with 
the Republic of Sudan”.51 This cooperation would provide a framework and 
expertise for joint actions in Sudan, encouraging cooperation of international 
institutions and stakeholders with the Sudanese authorities. UNESCO inter-
venes on the heritage management policies as a UN agency in accordance 
to the rules of collaboration defined by the CPA. UNESCO aims to “contri-
bute to address the root causes of the conflict and reshape the future of the 
country”.52 As a trade-off, Sudan appears as ‘proving ground’ for UNESCO’s 
ongoing reforms and programs.53 
As a result of the peace agreement, UNESCO became more present in 
Sudan. It first, opened a second office in Juba, which was in addition to the 
existing one in Khartoum, following its own reform on institutional decentra-
lisation. Second, UNESCO’s intervention in Sudan came in line with the 2005 
50. As a result of the CPA implementation, this institution was reconfigured as part 
of a broader reform of the national institutions, after the implementation of the 
Government of National Unity in 2005. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism has 
been divided into two ministries: the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports and the 
new Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife. Heritage management remains an attribution 
of the Ministry of Culture and the pre-existing NCAM remains the tutorial institution 
of heritage in the country.
51. UNESCO, 2005b.
52. UNESCO, 2006b.
53. A decentralisation process of UNESCO offices was initiated in 2000. Some multi-
country offices have been created in countries of the group E9 (the nine most popu-
lated countries of the world), less developed countries and post-conflict countries 
(UNESCO, 2006b).
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agency’s general program, on “post-conflict reconstruction and development” 
to be applied in several world regions and countries facing post-conflict situa-
tions.54 This program focuses on the fields of culture and education, and aims 
to work on the restoration of the educational systems, the promotion of inde-
pendent media, the protection of the environment and biological diversity, as 
well as the promotion of cultural diversity through the protection of tangible 
and intangible cultural heritage (UNESCO, 2005c). UNESCO’s “post-conflict 
reconstruction” program was later included in the “United Nations 2006 Work 
Plan for Sudan.”55 Hence, in terms of inclusion of heritage in the Sudanese 
peace implementation process, the role of UNESCO is to work jointly with the 
NCAM on the development of tangible heritage as well as on the promotion 
of intangible heritage. 
An official policy of decentralisation and reconciliation
Aware of the poor conditions suffered by the existing museums in Sudan, 
the NCAM planned in 2005 the construction of several museums constituting 
a network. According to a senior official of the Ministry of culture, this plan 
includes: (1) Renewal of existing museums (National Antiquities Museum in 
Khartoum and Jebel Barkal Site Museum in Karima, in the Northern State); (2) 
Creation of museum educational programs for schools and children; and (3) 
Creation of museums in capital regional states (fig. 1). 
The map on the opposite page shows the current situation of museum plan-
ning in Sudan, and depicts the three existing museums currently operational 
in three cities – Khartoum, Jebel Barkal, and Nyala (in white on the map). The 
map also includes the planned museums and their respective locations (in 
grey on the map), as will be mentioned in this section. Further, the relationship 
between the location of the planned museums and conflict flashpoints will be 
discussed.
The National Museum in Khartoum and the site museum of Jebel Barkal 
are the two existing museums of Sudan which exhibit archaeological objects 
found in main sudanese sites, namely the Jebel Barkal and the Napatan 
region.56 These two museums have undergone restoration as an outcome of 
54. UNESCO, 2005c and 2006b.
55.The United Nations agencies mediate the stakeholders through a strategy of regu-
lation and development of the decentralisation.
56. On the archaeological sites, see Ida Dyrkorn Heierland’s article in this volume. 
Most of the other museums are concentrated in Khartoum. Several other museums are 
in charge of the NCAM: Khalifa House in Khartoum or the Museum of Kerma inaugu-
rated in 2006. Some other private institutions such as the Ethnographic Museum are 
displaying national heritage. 
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1. Map of the existing and planned museums in Sudan (2007-2009) (Jean-Gabriel Leturcq, 2009)
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a UNESCO project (UNESCO Preservation of Endangered Objects Project – 
Sudan National Museum, Khartoum, and Jebel Barkal) that ran from 2004 to 
2006.57 Another museum was also opened in 2006 in Nyala, the capital of 
Southern Darfur. In addition, two other museums created in the 19th century 
still exist : the Khalifa House Museum in Omdurman (Khartoum State)58 and 
the Ali Dinar Palace in al-Fasher (Northern Darfur state).
Other museums are now under construction or are being planned in the 
capitals of some of the Sudanese regional states, such as in Dongola and Wadi 
Halfa59 (Northern State, Nubia, under construction)60; Juba (capital of Southern 
Sudan, construction in progress); Kassala (capital of the eastern region, also in 
progress); El-Obeid (capital of Kordofan, to be started); and Wad Medani (capi-
tal of the Gezira region). In addition, museums are also planned for Fashoda 
(Blue Nile state) and Geneina (Western Darfur state).61
The construction of museums in the regional capitals seems to follow the 
logic of the national policy of decentralisation, allegedly being followed by 
the Sudanese government in other policy areas. However, a relevant ques-
tion arises: considering the general state of underdevelopment of these cities, 
why is the construction of museums a priority? The map highlights part of the 
answer: the map of the planned museum overlaps the map of the conflicts’ 
hotspots, and surprisingly (or not) the first museum which was inaugurated is 
located in Nyala, the capital of Southern Darfur, which still remains a conflic-
tive area even after the peace agreement was signed in May 2006. 
It can be argued that museums are being built by the Sudanese authorities 
as a matter of political reconciliation, and as such are supposed to materialise 
and exhibit the official recognition of all the minorities of the country. The cur-
rent policy is thus promoting the museums mainly as State infrastructures, and 
the implementation of these institutions does not necessarily mean the imple-
mentation of heritage itself. Rather, the authorities continue to face a scarcity 
of collections to exhibit inside these would-be museums. The collections issue 
57. UNESCO, 2006a.
58. On the Khalifa House Museum and the importance of Mahdya’s period in terms 
of heritage, see the article of Iris Seri-Hersch in this volume.
59. On the Wadi Halfa Museum, see the article of Costanza de Simone in this volume.
60. A museum whose construction was patially supervised by the NCAM, opened in 
Kerma, 60 km north of Dongola. 
61. While this article goes under press, other museums are being planned in Begrawya 
(5th Cataract), Suakin (Red Sea state), Gedaref (Gedaref state) and Sennar (Sennar 
state) following Sennar dam elevation plans.
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in itself leads to a significant question: how does this museum policy contri-
bute to the definition of Sudanese heritage(s)? 
The dichotomy of the Sudanese heritages 
The map also calls to attention the two axes of development of heritage-
making in Sudan – one axis is devoted to the development in the Northern 
capitals (Jebel Barkal-Karima, Dongola, Kerma, Wadi Halfa), the second axis 
concerns the Southern capitals (Juba, Jonglei, Fashoda) and the ‘marginal’ 
regions (Nyala, El-Damazin, Kassala). This partition of heritage is rooted in the 
system of thinking with regards to Sudanese heritage since the colonial period. 
On the one hand, the Northern Nile valley is devoted to archaeologists; on 
the other hand, Southern Soudan and regions such as Darfour are relevant for 
anthropologists.
The archaeological expeditions in the Nile Valley began in the early 19th 
century, in line with Egyptian archaeology.62 During the British colonial occu-
pation, archaeological data had been used to confirm the historical power 
of Egypt over Nubia (at the time considered the region located between 
Aswan and Khartoum). Moreover, the paradigm of evolutionism dominated 
the archaeological approach used for research in Sudan. Contrary to this, 
the Southern Sudanese region was considered backward. The region was for 
the most part considered ahistorical and, as a result, no specific studies were 
carried out there before the beginning of the 20th century. It was during this 
time that the British administration ordered the undertaking of anthropological 
studies in order to understand and rule the region in a more comprehensive 
manner. It marks the period of the emergence of African anthropology, inclu-
ding the major contribution of Evans Pritchard’s studies on the Nuer and their 
neighbouring social groups.63
It is also during the colonial period that the major ethnographic collec-
tions were constituted in the European museums. For example, one of the 
most important collections of Sudanese artefacts is until now conserved in 
the Pitt Rivers Museum in Oxford. There is actually no collection of Sudanese 
ethnographic artefacts available in Sudan itself except at the small museum of 
ethnography in Khartoum. Moreover, there are just a few contemporary stu-
dies on the material culture of the Southern regions. Thus, the major problem 
remains to determine what exactly will be exhibited in the planned museums. 
As museums are institutions aiming to exhibit collections valorised as the heri-
tage of the community or the nation, which kind of heritage will be promoted 
in these would-be museums? 
62. Trigger, 1994, p. 325.
63. See Abdel Gaffar, 2003.
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In brief, it seems there is a vacuum on the substance of heritage and perhaps 
on the definition of the cultural artefacts that constitute heritage with regards 
to the Southern Sudanese regions. In 2006, the Ministry of Culture described 
these planned museums as “museums of cultural diversity where all tribes of 
the State will be represented with their costumes, musical instruments, tradi-
tional occupations and way of life, handicrafts, etc.”64 The minister’s unprecise 
words show that the authorities have no clear idea as to what would constitute 
the collections of the would-be museums in the regional states. The concept 
of heritage is applied in the peripheries, but is not yet, qualifying any object or 
artefact. Taking this into account, can these future museums still be considered 
as institutional means to create heritage?
The problematic creation of heritage
Currently, the archaeological material excavated from the northern part 
of Sudan, the so-called Nubian antiquities, are the only artefacts considered 
to have incontestable heritage value and are thus classified as national anti-
quities. The northern sites are already inscribed in the World Heritage list; the 
items are conserved and exhibited in the National Museum in Khartoum and 
the Jebel Barkal site. The prestige of these antiquities attracts foreign missions 
and attracts the attention of international museums, such as the Louvre or the 
British Museum. In recent years, these institutions have initiated bilateral coo-
perations in the field of museum and conservation planning for the National 
Museum and training courses of the NCAM staff. This trend shows a potential 
revalorisation of this given heritage, but with a limited potential in the national 
Sudanese context. Following the principles of decentralisation and recognition 
of minorities, only the populations from the Northern Sudan will benefit from 
the valorisation of those antiquities. Other fields of heritage must be created 
to compensate the absence of material heritage in the case of the Southern 
Sudanese regions. It is this situation that led UNESCO to promote intangible 
heritage according to its policy of “strengthening respect for cultural diversity 
towards intercultural dialogue and reconciliation in Sudan”.65 
In March 2006, the UNESCO office in Khartoum organised a set of consul-
tations and symposiums for the recognition and conservation of intangible 
heritage. These consultations aimed to inscribe Sudanese intangible heritage 
on the World Intangible Heritage List. The main goal was to promote the reco-
gnition of languages, practices, and music as national heritage that is worth 
promoting on the global list. In the same symposium, the UNESCO office also 
64. UNMIS, 2006, see also the article of Ida Dyrkorn Heierland in this volume.
65. UNESCO, 2006b.
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convened a meeting of experts, both from Northern and Southern Sudan, to 
debate the methodology to be used in the inventory of intangible cultural heri-
tage. The result was that an animated polemic took place.66 The experts could 
not agree on the definition of national heritage. For example, experts from 
the North presented a project to register the saqya (water wheel) in the World 
Intangible Heritage List. The saqya was qualified by the experts as the key of the 
social system on the Nile Valley. The Southern delegates argued that the saqya 
was only representative of the northern social system, and they in turn pre-
sented some socio-cultural aspects of the various southern regions (e.g., Nuba 
wrestling and Shilluk kingship). The result was that no clear tendencies could 
be drawn out of this meeting, except the protracted dichotomy between a uni-
fied Northern culture and a range of diverse positions from the Southern groups.
The institutionalisation of Sudanese heritage reflects the dichotomy of the 
Sudanese cultural context, still characterised by a tangible archaeological heri-
tage and, a multiplicity of regional and/or ethnical intangible heritage of the 
large Sudanese periphery (East, West, and South). The archaeological heritage 
became valorised for the “use” of the people from the political centre, i.e., 
riparian populations living on the Nile River banks, from where the Sudanese 
rulers and economic elites originated. Some of the possible effects of this 
increased gap might be a division reflecting general political trends – a tangible 
heritage of the dominant groups and an intangible heritage of the “others”. 
As mentioned earlier, the policy of heritage-making under implementation 
by the NCAM and UNESCO aims to fill the gaps of knowledge and to exhibit a 
complete picture of Sudanese national diversity, including tangible and intan-
gible heritage. The central question is then if the outcome of this policy is indeed 
challenging the existing paradigms of the ‘national’ identity in Sudan. Sudanese 
anthropologists have taken position against the dichotomy of Sudanese 
culture and assumed a renewed vision on the question of national history. 
For instance, Al-Amin proposes a vision of national history based on the com-
prehensive study of anthropological and historical interrelations between the 
diverse social groups of the country. This perspective intrinsically criticises the 
policy of cultural diversity, which is being nowadays implemented in Sudan.67 
A consequence of the policy of cultural diversity is the multiplication of 
claims for recognition of identity, and at the end of the process, the crys-
tallisation of an official perception of a multiplicity of cultures. This official 
perception can in fact run the risk of promoting a cluster of identities with no 
apparent relationships except for their conflictive potential. Moreover all the 
66. Interview with an international observer, March 2006.
67. Al-Amin, 2003. 
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groups are currently aware of the official concept of heritage as a means of 
recognition and valorisation of the “marginalised minorities”. The process of 
heritage-making risks being understood at a superficial level; the short-term 
political component of the process may interfere with the long-term process of 
cultural policies and the ideal of heritage as a means of pacification. The next 
section examines another side of the story: the subversion of the concept of 
heritage as a political means by opponents to the official centralised regime.
SUBVERSION OF THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL HERITAGE 
The previous sections have analysed how the process of heritage-making is 
being used by the Sudanese official authorities as means of political recognition 
of local communities. However, the appropriation of that conceptualisation of 
heritage by local populations may also constitute a political argument even-
tually turned against the central government. The aim of this section is to 
analyse precisely the effects of the politicisation of heritage-making through 
the case of the Merowe dam project in Northern Sudan. In this case, it will 
be shown how the populations affected by the construction of the large-scale 
dam of Merowe have been subverting the official discourse on heritage in 
order to gain some national and international visibility for their own purposes, 
i.e., the recognition of their political rights. 
The Hamadab/Merowe Dam construction
The construction of the Merowe dam at Hamadab68, on the 4th cataract 
of the Nile River, is presently the largest national hydroelectric project. The 
dam works started 2003 and was inaugurated in March 2008. The project 
cost around 2 billion US dollars, financed by China’s Exim bank and various 
Gulf investment funds. The new dam will eventually produce 1,250 megawatts 
of electricity according to the Sudanese authorities, and will cover 50% of 
Sudan’s hydropower needs necessary to sustain the booming economic deve-
lopment of the country. However, the dam will have some collateral effects, 
in the sense that the reservoir of the Merowe Dam will flood 175 km of the 
Nile Valley and is expected to displace around 50,000 people and submerge 
68. The dam was previously named Hamadab dam after its location. However, after 
some deadly clashes related with the displacement of the Hamadab people, the 
Sudanese authorities in charge of the project changed its name to Merowe dam, after 
the name of the city located in the opposite side of Karima, the capital of the Northern 
state, around 40 km from the dam’s site. 
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an area with an important archaeological potential.69 The situation recalls the 
consequences of the construction of the Aswan High Dam, located in Egypt 
but extending to Sudan, in the 1960’s. At the time, the Nubian communities 
both in Sudan and Egypt were displaced from their homeland. Their displa-
cement attracted little attention from the international community, especially 
when compared to the massive archaeological salvage campaign in the same 
area and the significant world attention it received. 
In the case of the Merowe dam, already by 2002 the would-be displaced 
local communities began pointing out the “loss of invaluable archaeologi-
cal and historical sites” and denounced the unfavourable conditions of their 
displacement.70 Three groups are to be displaced during the different phases 
of the construction of the Dam: the inhabitants of Hamadab and Amri, and 
the Manasir community.71 The inhabitants of Hamadab, where the dam itself 
is located, were displaced in 2003 as a result of conflict, and there were sev-
eral cases of people suffering injuries as they opposed the army in charge of 
the protection of the dam construction. The resettlement of people of Amri, 
an upstream group of hamlets, began in 2005, and a part of the population 
showed their disagreement with the conditions of relocation; in 2006, clashes 
occurred between security forces and local people, resulting in the death of 
two inhabitants. The resettlement location of the Manasir community, origi-
nally located in the upstream Nile State has not yet been determined.72 The 
traditional homeland of the Manasir is exclusively located on the 4th cataract 
area, and according to some activists the Manasir will eventually loose the 
totality of their homeland.73
69. The inundation actually started during the 2007 and 2008 floods period. However, 
the 2008 flood had been the most significant as the villages were totally being sub-
merged by waters while the inhabitants refused to leave the place. See Al-Jazeera 
(2008) coverage of the issue on the 5th of August 2008. 
70. Askouri, 2002, 2004a.
71. The Manasir consitute an ethnic group and refers to the area as the “Dar al 
Manasir” while Hamadab and Amri refers to villages whose populations are com-
posed of diverse ethnic groups (mainly from the Shacygiyya group) see Haberlah, 
2005.
72. Most of the community claims the right to settle on the shores of the lake that will 
be created once the dam’s reservoir will be filled. Up to now the community refused to 
leave the area and is nowadays living in precarious condition. It had also be common 
clashes between security forces and resettled population following conflict over the 
inappropriate conditions of living in the resettlement area. See, Sudan Tribune, 2009.
73. For more information on the Manasir, see Humbolt University Nubian Expedition 
2004-2006: http://www2.hu-berlin.de/daralmanasir/.
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Destruction of cultures and conservation of heritage
At the beginning of the construction of the dam, the affected local groups 
in the region claimed that their concern was with the conservation of their 
heritage, even if the resettlement issue was more likely to have been a higher 
priority than the heritage issue. How can we explain then the importance 
given to the issue of heritage when the basic survival of the community see-
med to be endangered? 
In their campaign for the promotion of the rights of the local people, the 
Leadership Office of Hamadab Affected People (LOHAP), a local activist group 
supported by the international advocacy group International Rivers Network 
since 200474, have since the beginning called for the respect of international 
standards, such as those of human rights and community protection, as well as 
the internationally accepted principles applying to the construction of large-
scale dams. The LOHAP have tried to draw national and international attention 
to the “violation of the recommendations made by the World Commission on 
Dams”75 perpetuated by the Sudanese government and companies involved 
in the Dam project. In 2000, the World Commission on Dams (WCD) issued 
an extensive report developing guidelines for the planning, construction and 
operation of dams worldwide.76 While recognising the role played by dams in 
economic development, the report highlighted the high risks usually faced by 
local communities. In the same report, the WCD adopted a rights-and-risks 
approach77 to be taken into account in the construction of future dams. The 
rights-and-risks approach consists of a framework which advises and requires 
the consultation of all stakeholders affected by a dam’s construction, in order 
to assure and promote an equitable development for all. The people affected 
by the Merowe Dam denounced the weakness of the feasibility studies car-
ried out by the Canadian consultant company Monenco Agra in 1993.78 They 
argued that later studies had disregarded the WCD principles in the assessment 
74. IRN, 2005.
75. Askouri, 2004b.
76. The WCD is an international and supposedly independent commission, financed 
by 54 organisations including governments, Agencies of the United Nations, develop-
ment agencies, philanthropic foundations or dam construction companies. Created in 
1997 by the World Bank and the World Conservation Union, its goal was to address 
the controversies concerning large dam construction and the resulting social, envi-
ronmental and cultural damages.
77. WCD, 2000, p. XXXVI.
78. The document is regarded as confidential because of the polemic context, thus it 
could not be consulted during my last stay in Sudan.
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studies arguing that the studies did not sufficiently include the resettlement 
issues, nor the environmental and cultural impacts of the Merowe dam project. 
The case highlights the misunderstanding between the local populations 
and the governmental authorities, namely the Archaeological Salvage Mission 
that was actually planned in the feasibility study according to the standards 
defined after the Aswan High Dam construction. Krzysztof Grzymski, the 
international expert in charge of the impact assessment study, highlighted the 
archaeological potential of the region to be flooded by the future reservoir 
and the little archaeological research done in the region. Therefore, starting in 
1999, the NCAM and several international partners launched survey studies 
aiming to identify a thousand potential archaeological sites. In 2003, the NCAM 
launched the Merowe Dam Archaeological Salvage Project, through an Appeal 
for rescuing a piece of Man’s cultural heritage79 to the international community. 
Ten international missions responded to the appeal and received concessions 
to conduct excavations in the region for the period between 2003 and 2008.80 
In this case, the interests of the different actors involved in the heritage-
making process can be easily identified. The NCAM, in order to attract foreign 
teams, promised an equitable share of the objects found in the 4th cataract 
area to be divided between the Sudanese authorities and the different interna-
tional missions. In addition, for the local population, the NCAM has planned 
to construct a museum in one of the resettlement locations, more specifically 
in Al-Multaga.81 A question arises: how can one explain the denouncement 
of the loss of archaeological data by the local populations, while the official 
authorities were already organising a salvage campaign? 
Cultural heritage as a weapon of the weak
The apparent redundancy between the population’s claims and the NCAM 
campaign can be explained by the development of the resistance campaign 
against the resettlement policies, which was taking place in the region. The 
following step of the disagreement between populations and the governmental 
79. NCAM, 2003.
80. The ACACIA project University of Cologne, Gdaisk Archaeological Museum 
Expedition (GAME), Polish Academy of Sciences, Humboldt University of Berlin, the 
Italian Institute for Africa and the Orient (IsIAO), the University College London, the 
Sudan Archaeological Research Society, the Hungarian Meroe Foundation and the 
University of California at Santa Barbara – Arizona State University consortium.
81. NCAM, 2003. A museum was finally planned at Merowe (on the Nile bank oppo-
site to Karima, Northern state). Contradictory sources denounce that the Museum 
would be included a project of an entertainment park “Merowe Land” (personal com-
munication with 4th Cataract residents, March 2009). 
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authorities occurred during the excavation seasons of 2005, 2006 and 2007.82 
In these periods, some groups affiliated with the LOHAP blocked the archaeo-
logists’ access to the archaeological fields located in the Manasir area. For 
instance, in February 2007, the groups argued that the international archaeo-
logists were working on the behalf of the government and not in the interests 
of the Manasir populations. Moreover they accused the foreign archaeologists 
of only being interested in the archaeological excavations. As a result, all the 
excavation teams whose concessions were located in the Manasir area were 
forced to return to Khartoum and discontinue their research in the region.83 
Back in Khartoum, negotiations between the archaeologists and the represen-
tatives of the LOHAP did not come up with solutions but actually deepened 
the misunderstanding between the two parties.84 The situation became para-
doxical, because the LOHAP, which had previously required archaeological 
excavations in the area in order to save the heritage of the region, later became 
responsible for stopping it. How is such a paradox explained?
The Merowe Dam case is evidence that the perceptions on the concept 
of heritage diverge, and this partly lies in the ambiguity surrounding the 
definition of the word heritage itself. Governmental authorities and local 
communities appear to be discussing two different things although they are 
using the same concept. On the one hand, the NCAM organised the salvage 
of archaeological data, and on the other hand the LOHAP is claiming property 
rights over their own heritage for the benefit of the local communities. The 
LOHAP claims very closely follows the discourse on identity that has been 
promoted by the CPA, as mentioned earlier in this article. The local commu-
nities consider archaeological objects as part of their heritage and, referring 
to the CPA’s conceptualisation, also as part of their identity. In the case of the 
Merowe Dam, the claims on heritage have been used mainly to gain public 
visibility for the cause and other political claims of the communities affec-
ted by the construction of the dam.85 The direct consequence of this coup on 
archaeological research has been the diffusion of the local political claims in 
the international media, such as Al-Jazeera86 or Financial Times.87 
This case throws light over the ambiguous interpretations and utilisation of 
the concept of heritage. Here, heritage does not appear anymore as a means 
of pacification, as it was discussed in the previous sections on the institutio-
82. Interview with a German archaeologist, 19th of February 2007.
83. LOHAP, 2007a.
84. Interview with a field inspector of the NCAM, 20th of February 2007.
85. LOHAP, 2007b.
86. See for example, Al-Jazeera, 2006.
87. England, 2007, See also Mojon, 2007; Boulding, 2008.
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nalisation of heritage and creation of museums in Sudan. Rather, heritage had 
been used in this case as a “weapon of the weak”.88 As defined by Scott, the 
weapons of the weak are the “everyday forms of resistance”89 and the wide 
range of means to protest that the peasants can use to resist a hegemon (the 
State or any local power) while at the same time avoiding an open conflict. 
The dissident group in the Merowe Dam area used antiquities and its poten-
tial power as a means of resistance to the ‘Sudanisation’ and centralisation of 
peripheries. The assimilation of antiquities as the heritage of a group reveals a 
problem of definition of the terms national, local and/or communitarian heri-
tage. The antiquities excavated from the 4th cataract area are in continuation of 
those conserved in the National Museum in Khartoum. These antiquities are 
by essence considered as national heritage. 
What is interesting to observe is how the discourse of the LOHAP has 
changed over time, from that of victimisation at the beginning to that of 
denouncement later. The activist group has used heritage issues as a way of 
denouncing the opacity of the politics related to the dam construction. At 
the same time, the group has also used the public and international media 
to threaten the central authorities with the prospect of a general uprising of 
the populations in the northern regions of Sudan, usually considered as the 
regions supporting the regime in Khartoum. At some point in time, the leader 
of the LOHAP Ali Askouri has been presented, not just as an activist defen-
ding local rights, but as a politician challenging the central government. Not 
by chance, Askouri has never denied the alliances formed with the Southern 
movement, the SPLM.91 In the following months, the question of heritage 
disappeared from his discourse which assumed a more political orientation, 
strongly influenced by Garang’s vision on an opposition between the country’s 
periphery and political centre based in Khartoum.92 
In conclusion, the activists on the behalf of the local populations dispos-
sessed from political representation and economic power have used heritage 
as a way to access the media and claim for rights, not just cultural but political 
rights as well. The shift in the LOHAP’s position, from a valorisation of heritage 
issues to a more political agenda, can be partially explained by the fact that 
the movement became stronger. Nevertheless, heritage remained a “weapon 
of the weak” for the populations living in the 4th cataract area still to be resett-
led. The groups of Amri, whose position was weakened by internal divisions, 
88. Scott, 1985.
89. Scott, 1985, p. 5.
90. Askouri, 2007b.
91. Askouri, 2007a.
92. Askouri, 2007c.
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have welcomed some archaeological teams expelled from the Manasir area in 
February and March 2007.93 The case of the 4th cataract is evidence for how 
local and marginalised groups have assimilated the concepts and discourse on 
heritage promoted by UNESCO and other international institutions or activists. 
As observed in the case of creation of museums in the regional states and heri-
tage-making policies appear to serve the recognition of the “minorities” or the 
“marginalised” regions such as the 4th cataract area. 
CONCLUSION
This article has analysed the current modus operandi of heritage-making in 
Sudan. It was shown how heritage had been and is being used as a political 
resource in the context of “post-conflict” Sudan in order to favour the so-called 
national unity of the country. The current heritage-making policy was designed 
allegedly to counter the narratives of conflictive identities that were developed 
during the civil wars and, at the same time, to promote cultural, religious, and 
ethnic diversity in Sudan. Heritage-making was defined by the peace imple-
mentation documents as a process of recognition of diversity at the national 
level and supposedly of the diverse identities at the local level. 
In this context, the national policy of heritage-making consists mainly of 
the construction of a network of new museums to be built in Sudanese terri-
tory. It was observed that the map of these museums overlaps with the map 
of the conflict areas. The problem of these would-be museums is that there is 
still no consensus on the collection of objects to be exhibited. Moreover, the 
construction of heritage itself, i.e. the identification of a Sudanese national 
heritage, seems to reinforce the long-lasting dichotomy of cultures in Sudan: 
on the one hand, the archaeological tangible heritage in the North of the 
country and, on the other hand, the anthropological intangible heritage in 
the South. Summing up, a vacuum on the substance and the definition of a 
Sudanese heritage has been identified.
The article has also shown that the ambiguity surrounding the definition 
of heritage has led to perceptions of heritage as a political tool that can be 
appropriated and subverted by communities at the local level. The case of 
the Merowe dam project in Northern Sudan highlighted how the populations 
affected by the construction of the large-scale dam used heritage as a “wea-
pon of the weak”: the populations dispossessed from political representation 
and economic power have used heritage as a way to access the media and to 
93. Interviews with locals and archaeologists in Amri, 28th of February 2007.
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claim for rights, not just cultural but also political rights. A consequence of 
this policy of promotion of cultural diversity in Sudan is the multiplication of 
claims for recognition of identity. At the end of the process, this policy might 
lead to a crystallisation of an official perception of multiplicity of cultures. The 
case of subversion of the current policy of heritage-making already proves that 
peace is not possible without a reformulation of the narratives of identity in 
the Sudanese context.
The recommendation of the author of this article is that the negative image 
of identity should be assumed in the heritage-making policies instead of trying 
to compulsorily promote a positive image of identity. The relationships between 
groups, whether conflictive, commercial or cultural, should be stressed in 
order to enhance the links between the communities. Thus, the concept of 
cultural alterity should be used instead of cultural diversity. By cultural alterity, 
one means the recognition of the dynamics of exchange between the diverse 
social groups. This assumed alterity could ideally transcend the ethnic, cultu-
ral, and religious differences in the Sudanese context; and, it can promote the 
vision of the “many things in common” that constitutes the idea of a nation as 
defined by Renan at the beginning of this article.
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